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European Community law-· Greek-Slavo-Macedonian conflict-er,;ibargoes 
COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES V. HELLENIC REPUBLIC. Case C-120 /94. 
Court ofJustice of the European Communides, filed April 22, 1994. 
Greece maiptains that the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) is 
threatening Greece's territorial integrity, as well as its national identity, by calling it~elf 
"Macedonia," usingan ancient M4cedonian sy~bol in its national flag and indulging in 
propag~nda hostile to Greek interests. Therefore, in February 1994, Greece unilater-
ally imposed a trade embargo on FYROM, which inflicts serious pressure on the weak 
· economy of the new state. lri spring 1994, the Commission of the European Commu-
nities (the Commission) filed a suit against Greece at the European Court of Justice (the 
Court). The suit claimed t~at the Greek trade embargo violates the Europe'1:n Commu- . 
nity' s legal regime of commercial poHcy, which prohibits unilateral measures .involving 
trade policy by member states. The Court refuted the Commission's request for interim 
relief for lack of the requisite urgency by preliminary injunction. The lawsuit was still 
pending at the time of writing, but some observers interpret the Court's decision as a 
sign that the Court favorsapolitical solution, and might try to avoidjudicial clarification 
of the sensitive issues at stake. This case raises the question of the extent to which a 
regio.nal legal regime should tolerate unilateral actions, based on national interests, that 
tend to hamper economic and legal integration. 
The dissolution·of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia began with the seces-
sion~ of Slovenia and Croatia in J une 1991. The Macedonian government organized a 
referendum on independence on September 8, 1991. After 95 percent of the voters 
endorsed the proposition, the republic enacted a state constitution on November 1 7, 
1991. Finally, by the spring of 1992, Yugoslavi':1 ceased to exist as a subject of public 
international law .1 
· Greece clai~s that .the creation of the new independent -state at its northern border 
constitutes a double threat: a <langer to its territorial integrity and a menace to its na-
tional identity and cultural heritage. According to Greece, the threat to its territorial 
integrity consists in the Slavic republic's name, irredentist propaganda against Greece, 
certain provisions in the Macedonian Constitution, and the official use of schoolbooks 
containing misleading geographical facts. 2 The impact on Greek national identity is 
attributed .to usurpation and monopolization of Macedonian history, art and symbols. 3 
1 See Opinion N~. 8 of July 4, 1992, of the so-called Badinter Commission, 4 EUR. J. INT'L L. [EJIL] 87 
(1993), 31 ILM 1521 (1992). This commission, composed of members of the Constitutional Courts of several 
European states under the chairmanship of the former Frenc;h Minister of Justice, Robert Badinter, was set 
n up by the European Community and its inember states in the summer of 1991 as the arbitral body of the Peace 
Confererice.on Yugoslavia, and it delivered several opinions on legal questions regarding the breakdown of 
Yugoslavia. 
2 The Greek position is. summarize~ in Dj.a ta.vta iitoume tin aporipsi, To BIMA (Athens), Jurie 12, 1994, at 
A20. See also INSTITUTE OF POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC STUDIES (Athens), THE MACEDONIAN AFFAIR: A 
HISTORICAL REVIEW OFTHEATTEMPTS TO CREATEA COUNTERFEIT NATION 5 (1991). 
3 See the summary ofthe Greek Government's response ofMay 19, 1994, to the Commission's action, To 
BIMA,June 12, 1994, at A20. 
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Among these grievances, the issues of the new state's name and the national flag are 
central, although they appear at first glance to be of merely symbolic importance. 
Greece, however, sees them as evidence of its neighbor's nationalist and revisionist ten-
dencies. The Greek Government officially deplores that the former Yugoslav republic, 
once it attained independence in 1991, called itself ''Republic of Macedonia. ''4 In De-
cember 1992, with a view to gaining international recognition, the Slavic Macedonian 
Assembly decided to add "Skopje" to the state's name, and promised to use only "Re-
public of Macedonia (Skopje)" as the official denomination in international relations. 5 
But Greece also rejects this name. The national flag of FYROM is criticized for showing 
not only the star of Vergina, but also three waves, which could be read as symbolizing 
that Macedonia stretches to the Mediterranean. 
The grievances must be seen against the historical and political background of the 
area that now constitu tes FYR O M. As a resul t of the Balkan W ars of 1912 - 1913, the 
region was divided among Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia. lt was only in the twentieth 
century that politicians and historians virtually created a "Macedonian" nation within 
the newly founded state of Yugoslavia by a conscious effort of nation building. 6 How-
ever, the neighboring countries tend to deny that a Macedonian nation exists at ·all.7 
Greece now advances elaborate historical, ethnical and geographical arguments to 
prove that Macedonia is essentially Greek. 8 
In sum, a host of political, psychological and ideological factors led Greece to impose 
a total trade embargo on FYROM on February 16, 1994. The embargo bans transship-
ments to FYROM from all Greek customs points and allows entry only to food and 
medicine. 9 
The Commission of the European Communities criticized the Greek action as viola-
tive of the Community's common commercial policy and filed suit against Greece at the 
Court on April 22, 1994. For the first time in the Community's history, the case is being 
handled as a nonpublic suit under Article 225 of the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community (EC Treaty). 10 This is an exception to the general rule of Article 28 of the 
Statute of the Court of Justice, which provides for a public procedure. The special 
procedure is being utilized to protect the defendant's national security interests. 
Simultaneously, the Commission also sought an interlocutory injun~tion that would 
suspend the measures taken by Greece. 11 Generally, the Court can grant interim relief 
when circumstances establish urgency ahd factual and legal grounds offer a prima facie 
justification forit. 12 This determination also involves balancing the interests at stake. In 
this case, the Court held that the Commission had failed to show the requisite urgency. 
Thus, the Court dismissed the Commission's application by order onJune 29, 1994. 13 
The Commission argues that the unilateral imposition of the trade embargo violated 
Articles 113 and 224 of the EC Treaty, as well as obligations arising from common 
4 Id. 
5 Jens Reuter, Politik und Wirtschaft in Makedonien, 42 SünosTEUROPA 96 (1993). 
6 Stefan Troebst, Makedonische Antworten auf die "makedonische Frage" 1944-1992: Nationalismus, Republiks-
griindwzg, nation-building, 41 SÜDOSTEUROPA 432 (1992); MICHAEL B. COSMOPOULOS, MACEDONIA, AN 
lNTRODUCTION TO lTS POLITICAL HISTORY 89-93 (1992). 
7 See Duncan M. Perry, Macedonia: From Independence to Recognition, 3 RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIB-
ERTY RESEARCH REPORT, No. l ,Jan. 7, 1993, at 119, 120. 
8 See POLYS A. MYLONAS, l ELLINIKOTITA TIS MAKEDONIAS (1984). 
9 WASH. POST, Feb. 19, 1994, at A22. 
lO TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, Mar. 25, 1957' as amended by Treaty 
on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 31 ILM 247 (1992) [hereinafter EU Treaty]. 
11 Such injunctions are possible under Article 186 of the EC Treaty and Articles 83-86 of the Rules of 
Procedure of the Court of J ustice. 
12 See Article 83(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court. 
13 Case C-120/94 R, Notice No. 94/218/08, 1994 O.J. (C 218) 4. 
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importation and expo.rt~tion rules under various EC regulations. 14 The legal basis for 
this argument i~ the following: as the EC was primarily constructed as an economic 
community, its member states are not supposed to pursue individual trade policies but 
a "common commercial policy based on uniform principles" (title VII of the EC 
Treaty). This means that, as a rule, the member states do not have legal competence to 
un~ertake measures of trade policy that deviate from the common principles. 
By contrast, the areas of foreign and security policy are not integrated within the 
Community's legal regime. The. member states retain sole authority over their national 
foreign policies, ahhough some level of coordination is attempted. With the foundation 
of the European Union on the basis of the Treaty of Maastricht of February 7, 1992, 
this coordination theoretically reached a new dimension. U nder the auspices of the 
European Union (EU), an institutionalized Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) was introduc:~d':as a second pillar beside the European Community. 15 
The legal issue pres·ented in this case arises from the fact that the imposition of a trade 
embargo falls in a gray area between trade policy and foreign policy. "Trade embargo" 
as a legal term means the unilateral or collective restriction of importation or exporta-
tion ofgoods, materials, capital or services from or to a certain country for political or 
security reasons, with the intention of forcing that state to adopt a certain course of 
conduct as a r.esult of the deprivation of goods. 16 Thus, the acting state uses trade policy 
to achieve a foreign policy goal. Because of this double nature, scholars have disputed 
whether an embargo constitutes a measure of trade policy in terms of the EC Treaty 
and therefore falls within the power of the Community, or whether it is a foreign policy 
rileasure to be taken by the member states. 17 · 
In Commission v. Hellenic Republic, the C.ommission pointed out that the EC Treaty 
transf erred form er state powers in the field of trade policy to the Comrimnity, so that 
the memher states are no longer totally free to choose the means to realize a certain 
foreign policy. Greece claimed that the embargo measures were permissible because 
they were not directed at the regulation of the flow of commerce with a third country. 18 
This view had indeed been favored by the Council of the European Community until 
1980. lt maintained that the states were competent to impose embargoes, whereas the 
Commission c:lnd the majority of scholars of EC law have· always held that embargoes 
fall within the scope of the common trade policy. 19 Supporters of the latter position, in 
my view, are· correct in observing that present-day linking of political and economic 
state actioti rules out any narrow conception of trade policy. 20 This view was explicitly 
adopted by the .Europeah Court in an opinion concerning development policy. Here 
the Court stated that Article 113 ,does not ''restrict the common commercial policy to 
the use of instruments intended · to have an effect only on the traditional aspects of 
external tra,de" and reasoned that a "restrictive interpretation of the concept of com-
mon commercial policy would risk causing disturbances in intra-Community trade by 
reason of the disparities which would then exist in certain sectors of economic relations 
14 See Notice No. 94/Cl 74/23, 1994 0.J. (C 174) 10-11. 
15 See title V of the EU Treaty for details. 
16 Hans G. Kausch, Embargo, in [Installment] 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 169, 170 
(Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1985). 
17 See KAI HAILBRONNER, HANDKOMMENTAR ZUM EWGV, Rnr. 40 zu Art. 113 EWGV (Supp. No. 2, 
1994) (giving further authorities). . . 
18 Notice No. 94/Cl 74/23, 1994 O.J. (C 174) 10-11. 
19 Christoph Vedder, Rnr. 57 zu Art. 113 EWGV, in KOMMENTAR ZUM EG-VERTRAG (Eberhard Grabitz 
ed., Supp. No. 5, 1992) (giving further authorities). 
20 See, e.g., Pieter Jan Kuyper, Trqde Sanctions, Security and Human Rights and Commercial Policy, in THE 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY's COMMERCIAL POLICY AFTER 1992: THE LEGAL DIMENSION 387, 422 (Marc 
Maresceau ed., 1993). 
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with non-member countries. " 21 However, the question of embargoes can be distin-
guished from all cases decided by the Court up to now with regard to Article 113 of the 
EC Treaty, because an embargo does not have any trade political goals, but pursues 
foreign policy goals exclusively. Only once has the Court dealt with the question 
whether a strategic embargo was compatible with the EC Treaty. 22 In this case, how-
ever, the Court examined the question merely with reference to the rules of the internal 
movement of goods, and did not apply Article 113 of the EC Treaty. 
Indeed, EC practice has conformed to the notion that embargoes fall within the scope 
of the Community's Common Commerce Policy. Conceding the political nature of an 
embargo, however, EC practice has acknowledged a two-step competence of the Com-
munity and its member states. Embargoes are decided upon by the member states 
within the framework of the CFSP23 and then executed as a Community measure. This 
practice is re:flected by the new Article 228a, which was inserted into the EC Treaty by 
the Maastricht amendments24 and clarifies that the Community can rely on its exclusive 
power to regulate trade, even if its action serves a foreign policy goal, and thus impose 
an embargo. 25 
In sum, the treaty provisions, their underlying rationale and the Community practice 
justify the Commission's position that the mere fact that the Greek action was not in-
tended as a commerce regulation does not remove it from the scope of the EC Treaty. 26 
Once imposition of an embargo is understood as a Community measure, the escape 
clauses of Articles 223 and 224 of the EC Treaty and, as a special clause concerning the 
common rules for exports, Article 11 of Council regulation (EEC) No. 2603/6927 come 
into play when vital interests of member states are affected. In this case, the most perti-
nent provision is Article 224: 
Member States shall consult each other with a view to taking together the steps 
needed to prevent the functioning of the common market being affected by meas-
ures which a Member State may be called upon to take in the event of serious 
internal disturbance affecting the maintenance of law and order, in the event of 
war or serious international tension constituting a threat of war, or in order to carry 
out obligations it has accepted for the purpose of maintaining peace and security. 
Article 224 seeks to reconcile the security interests of a single member state with the 
Community's interest in the smooth functioning of the Common Market. Its wording 
shows that it refers to such unilateral actions as are generally foreclosed by the Com-
munity's legal regime, because only such actions may "affect" the "functioning of the 
common market." The provision thus implies that, whenever a meinber state takes a 
unilateral measure in a field where, under normal conditions, only Community organs 
are competent, the functioning of the Common Market will be threatened. In this case, 
21 Opinion 1/78, International Agreement on Natural Rubber, 1979 ECR 2871, 2913, paras. 44-45. 
22 J;ase C-367 /89, Aime Richardt and Les Accessoires Scientifiques SNC, 1991 ECR 1-4621. 
23 Before Maastricht within the CFSP's forerunner, the so-called European Political Co-operation. 
24 EC Treaty Article 228a states: 
Where it is provided, in a common position or in a joint action adopted according to the provisions of 
the EU Treaty relating to a common foreign and security policy, for an action by the Community to 
interrupt or to reduce, in part or completely, economic relations with one or more third countries, the 
Council shall take the necessary urgent means. The Council shall act by a qualified majority on a proposal 
from the Community. 
25 RUDOLF GEIGER, EG-VERTRAG. KOMMENTAR ZU DEM VERTRAG ZUR GRÜNDUNG DER EUROPÄISCHEN 
GEMEINSCHAFT, Rnr. 7 zu Art. 224 (1993). At the same time, the provision implies that such a measure will 
be decided on by the member states within the CFSP and only then be executed as an overall Community 
embargo. 
26 Cf Notice No. 94/Cl 74/23, 1994 O.J. (C 174) 10. 
27 1969 0.J. (L 324) 28. 
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the functioning of the Common Market may be endangered by the fact that firms from 
other member states cannot trade with FYROM via Greece. 
The clause does not explicitly empower the member states to resort to unilateral 
action but implies that, under the enumerated conditions, such measures are permitted 
as an exception to the general rule. 28 The three authorizing conditions can be summa-
rized as reasons of internal security, external security or international security. Greece 
now claims that its exterior, as well as its interior, security is endangered, because 
Skopje's conduct constitutes a threat of war and the Greek people are so deeply dis-
turbed that, without the economic sanctions imposed on FYROM, the public authorities 
would no longer be able to control the interior situation of the state.29 
Ultimately, of course, the Court's task is to balance the competing interests and de-
eitle whether a state may lawfully resort to the clause. However, in view of the absence 
of substantive case law on Article 224,30 it is unclear what degree of judicial scrutiny is 
tobe exercised with respect to the clause. States and also scholars have often maintained 
that the safeguard clause of Article 224 is a true reserve of sovereignty, and is therefore 
subject only to loose judicial review. 31 That is, the decision whether a situation is "seri-
ous" and what is a necessary response to that situation is to a certain extent a matter of 
political evaluation. 32 The Court has not explicitly rejected this view of Article 224, 
but it has clone so for other EC Treaty provisions allowing exceptions from specific 
Community obligations, such as Articles 36, 48(3) and (4), 55, 56, and 100a(4), cl. 1.33 
Additionally, the Court has twice placed Article 224 on the same footing as the other 
exceptions. 34 This could lead to the conclusion that the rules providing for strict judicial 
review of the specific exceptions also apply to Article 224 and that Article 224 is there-
fore subject to füll judicial scrutiny. 
Notably, a parallel between Articles 36 and 224 suggests itself. Under Article 36, 
member states' deviations from the rules on the free movement of goods may be justi-
fied for reasons of "public security." In the Aime Richardt case, the Court explicitly 
stated that this justification also covers reasons of exterior security. 35 In the instant case, 
the Commission relies on a parallel interpretation of Articles 224 and 36 by arguing 
that Greece did not establish that its security is objectively threatened by reference to 
objective circumstances. 36 In an earlier case the Court had indeed required that, within 
the ambit of Article 36, the action in question "must be justified by objective circum-
stances corresponding to the needs of public security.' '37 However, in the more recent 
Aime Richardt, which was the Court's first decision on the compatibility of a trade em-
bargo for security reasons with the EC Treaty, the Court did not analyze the issue in a 
28 Peter Gilsdorf, Rnr. 2 zu Art. 224, in 4 KOMMENTAR ZUM EWG-VERTRAG (Hans von der Groeben et al. 
eds., 2d ed. 1991); Advocate General Jacobs, Opinion, in Aime Richardt, 1991 ECR at 4643, para. 32. 
29 To BIMA,june 12, 1994, at A20. 
30 In the Jolrnston case, the referring state had asked for an interpretation of Article 224, but the Court did 
not pronounce itself on the substantive requirements of the clause, because it deemed specific provisions in a 
directive as a sufficient legal basis for resolution ofthe conflict. Case 222/84,Johnston v. Chief Constable of 
the Royal Ulster Constabulary, 1986 ECR 1651, 1692, para. 60. 
31 Waldemar Hummer, Rnr. 6 vor Art. 223-225, in KOMMENTAR ZUM EWG-VERTRAG, supra note 19 
(giving further authorities). 
32 The Creek Government pointed this out in its response to the Commission's action. To BIMA,June 12, 
1994, at A20. 
33 See, e.g., Cas"e 2/74,J. Reyners v. Belgian State, 1974 ECR 631,654, para. 43; andAime Richardt, 1991 
ECRat 1-4651, para. 19. 
34 Johnston, 1986 ECR at 1684, para. 26; Case 13/68, SpA Salgoil v. Italian Ministry for Foreign Trade, 
1968 ECR 453, 463. However, the differences must be noted: on the one hand, Article 224 is broader than 
the specific exceptions, because it allows a deviation from all treaty obligations. On the other hand, its condi-
tions are narrower. 
35 1991 ECR at 1-4652, para. 22. 
36 Notice No. 94/Cl 74/23, 1994 O.J. (C 174) 11. 
37 Case 72/83, Campus Oil Limited v. Minister for Energy, 1984 ECR 2727, 2752, para. 36. 
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similar way, but allowed member states discretion in determining the kind of restric-
tions necessary to protect public security. 38 In contrast, the Court had formerly stated 
that Article 224 deals "with exceptional and clearly defined cases"39 and concluded that 
the limited character of the dause rules out any broad interpretation.40 However, the 
Court's strict interpretation of Article 224 is problematic, because it is hardly conceiv-
able that in all the various situations falling short of Article 224, member states' political 
decisions are actually foreclosed by Community law. 
In addition, the limits of judicial review are quite clearly indicated by the notion of 
"misuse" in Article 225(2), holding that complaints under Article 225 are well-founded 
only when the "Member State is making improper use of its powers provided for in art. 
... 224." Thus, Greece cannot turn tö Article 224 if the contested measure, although 
in principle covered by the provision, constitutes a misuse of its powers. I now examine 
whether such misuse is present here. 
In Commission v. Hellenic Republic, the Commission describes "misuse" in the sense of 
Article 225 by saying that the Greek Republic used the exceptional powers for ends other 
than those provided for in the Treaty. 41 This phrase relies on the usual understanding of 
"misuse of powers" as grounds for illegality in an action for annulment under Article 
173 of the EC Treaty, which is itselfbased on the French administrative law concept of 
"detournement de pouvoir."42 This understanding of "misuse," focusing on the ends 
of powers provided for in the Treaty, raises the question whether Greece's ultimate 
purpose of preserving its national identity and cultural heritage is a legitimate objective 
in terms of the safeguard clause, or-as the Commission put it-outside the purpose 
of the Treaty and therefore a misuse of the powers the clause conf ers on one mem-
ber state. · 
The 1992 EU Treaty is not completely indifferent to the member states' interest 
in preservation of their national identity and cultural heritage. Hence, the Preamble 
formulates the goal of the EU as "desiring to deepen the solidarity between the peoples 
while respecting their culture and their traditions." Although, according to Article L 
of the EU Treaty, the Court has no jurisdiction to interpret and apply title I (common 
provisions, Articles A- F) and the Preamble is not an operative part of the Treaty, the 
Court-which usually favors the teleological interpretation43 -may use it as a guide-
line for treaty interpretation.44 Moreover, Article F(l) of the EU Treaty reads: "The 
Unionshall respect the national identities of its Member States." lf Article F(l) of the 
EU Treaty is deemed applicable, the dause can only clarify that national identity may be 
a legitimate argument against Community claims for unification and harmonization. lt 
is obvious that national interests cannot altogether trump the treaty obligations, but 
that a compromise must be found. 
Another argument in relation to the Treaty of Maastricht can be made in favor of the 
defendant: Greece had conditioned its signature of the EU Treaty on a promise by the 
other members that they would recognize a "special Greek interest in Macedonia." 
Henceforth, all relevant EC statements employed the name "Skopje."45 Moreover, the 
EC member states made several, albeit vague, statements to the effect that they would 
38 Aime Richa rdt, 1991 ECR 1-4621. 39 johnston, 1986 ECR at 1684, para. 26. 
40 Id.; also SpA Salgoil, 1968 ECR at 463. 
41 See Notice No. 94/Cl 74/23, 1994 O.J. (C 174) 11. 
42 See, e.g., JoSEPHINE SHAW, EUROPEAN CoMMUNITY LAW 201 (1993). 
43 Cf HENRY G. SCHERMERS, jUDICIAL PROTECTION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 18-26 (5th ed. 
1992). 
44 The lacking of competence to apply a certain provision directly does not seem to preclude the interpreta-
t'ion of other rules in the light of this provision, as the practice of national courts interpreting national laws in 
a Community-conforming fashion shows. 
45 Reuter, supra note 5, at 97. 
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pursue a recognition policy acceptable to all parties. 46 However, the Creek demands 
and the positive response of the other men:ibers were not formal treaty reservations in 
a legal sense, but arrangements on a political level. Still, as a bona fide consideration it 
might to a certain extent weaken the argument that Creece is now misusing the escape 
clause. 
On the whole, it can be concluded that concerns of national identity are not per ~e 
illegitimate as ajustification for deviations from the Community's legal regime. There-
fore, the misuse can hardly be founded solely on the concept of misuse based on a 
"detournement de pouvoir," as endorsed by the Commission. Moreover, this concep-
tion of misuse is problematic because of its vagueness, and because it seems difficult to 
ascertain the acting state's "true" motives. lt may be more illuminating to consider 
different categories of misuse. 
Scholars have pointed to the following categories of misuse: the obligation to consult 
the other member states has been violated; the member state's reaction is unreasonable; 
the factual situation described in Article 224 is altogether absent. 47 The first two cate-
gories deserve some explanation. If a member state intends to rely on Article 224, it 
must meet not only the substantive conditions of the clause, but also procedural re-
quirements. The acting state must "consult" the other members. To serve its purpose 
of protecting the functioning of the Common Market, the consultation must take place 
before the enactment of the unilateral measure. 48 In this case, Creece informed the 
other member states five days after the imposition of the embargo.49 
The second category of misuse is seen as an unreasonable or disproportionate reac-
tion. 50 The overriding principle of proportionality generally governs the Community's 
legal regime. 51 In the context of Article 224, the principle of proportionality demands 
that the acting state take such means as will aff ect the functioning of the Common Mar-
ket in the most minimal way, while still effectively serving the state's purpose. 52 lt is a 
question of fact whether Creece has taken enough diplomatic steps to induce FYROM 
to change its name and flag. Since FYROM has already made compromises by adding 
"Skopje" to its name and amending its Constitution, intensive pressure seems necessary 
to force FYROM to comply further with Creek demands. On the other hand, experience 
shows that economic sanctions such as boycotts are often ineffective. A measure of du-
bious ability to further the foreign policy goal that is certain to affect the European 
Common Market probably must be characterized as unreasonable. 
In addition to the commonly held categories of misuse of the extraordinary permis-
sion given to member states under Article 224, the principle of estoppel provides some 
guidelines for determining whether a case of misuse is present. Estoppel might bar 
Creece from relying on the argument that the use of the name "Macedonia" and the 
symbol in the national flag constitutes a threat to its national identity and thus creates 
serious tension as described in Article 224. The doctrine of estoppel, as it operates in 
public international law and EC law, serves to protect the settled expectations of states 
that relied in good faith on clear and unambiguous representations by another state 
46 Council Decision of May 2, 1992; statement of the Council of June 27, 1992. See paras. 16, 17 of the 
Court's order of June 29, 1994, not yet reported. 
47 Vedder, Rnr. 4 & 6 zu Art. 224, in KOMMENTAR ZUM EWG-VERTRAG, supra note 19. 
48 Id., Rnr. 4 zu Art. 224. 
49 Nikos Marakis, Poia tha einai i grammi yperasp_isis, To BIMA, Apr. 10, 1994. 
50 Advocate General Jacobs, Opinion, in Aime Richardt, 1991 ECR at I-4644, para. 33. See also the obser-
vations of the Commission injohnston, 1986 ECR at 1674. 
51 JÜRGEN SCHWARZE, EUROPEAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 708-866 (1988, Eng. trans. ECSC-EEC-EAEC, 
1992). 
52 Gilsdorf, supra note 28, Rnr. 7 zu Art. 224. 
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by precluding the latter from subsequently adopting different statements. 53 lt must 
therefore be seen whether Creece's present claim contradicts its previous attitude in 
the context of FYROM's struggle for international recognition. 54 
On December 16, 1991, the EC member states enacted the "Cuide-lines on the Rec-
ognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union," which set up con-
ditions that the states seeking international recognition bad to meet. The guidelines 
required, inter alia, ''respect for the inviolability of all frontiers w~ich can be changed 
only by peaceful means and by common agreement. " 55 The guidelines were endorsed 
within the framework of the European Political Co-operation, that is, unanimously, 
including the Creek vote. On the same day, the EC meinbers adopted a common posi-
tion with regard to the recognition of the Yugoslav republics. 56 This document stated 
that those republics seeking recognition bad to submit an applic~tion to the Commu-
nity, which would be presented to an arbitration commission.' iThis commission had 
been installed on August 27, 1991, by the EC member states, again with Creek support. 
The so-called Badinter Commission examined the Macedonian application for recogni-
tion and took into consideration certain provisions of the new Macedonian Constit~t.ion 
of November 1 7, 1991. N otably, the Macedonian parliament had enacted two coh~ti-
tutional amendments with a view to the European guidelines on recognition. These 
amendments, of January 6, 1992, read as follows: 
I. 1. The Republic of Macedonia has no territorial claims against neighbouring 
states. The borders of the Republic of Macedonia could be changed only in ac-
cordance with the Constitution, and based on the principle of voluntariness and 
generally accepted international norms. 
II. 1. The Republic shall not interfere in the sovereign rights of other states 
and their internal a:ffairs. 57 
The second amendment was designed with regard to Article 49 of the Constitution. 
This provision, which states that "[t]he republic looks after the position and the rights 
of members of the Macedonian people in the neighbouring countries and emigrants 
from Macedonia, supports their cultural development and promotes the ties to them," 
had been interpreted by Greece as further evidence of Macedonian territorial am-
bitions. 
Its examination of the submitted material led the tribunal to the conclusion that the 
former republic of Mace~onia satisfied the conditions in the European guidelines. In an 
opinion of January 11, 1992, the Badinter Commission stated 
that the Republic of Maceclonia has; moreover, renounced all territorial .claims of 
any kind in unambiguous Statements binding in international law; that the use of 
53 Although EC law is a legal body distinct from public international law, both legal orders derive general 
principles from national law, such as the notion of estoppel, which originated in the common law. For the 
incorporation of estoppel into Community law, see the Opinion of the Advocate General, Joined Cases 63 
and 64/79, 1980 ECR 2975, 3002, but see Case 230/81, 1983 ECR 255,296, para. 23. The rule that a 
member state failing to implement a directive "may not, against. individuals, plead its own failure to perform 
the obligations which the directive entails," Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90, 1991 ECR I-5357, 5408, 
para. 11, can be analyzed as a case of estoppel, Opinion of the Advocate General, Case C-262/88, 1990 EGR 
1-1889, 1935-36. However, the Court did not accept estoppel as a bar to bringing an action before the 
Court, see Case 166/78, 1979 ECR 2575, 2596, para. 6, contrary to the opinion of the Advocate General, id. 
at 2605-08. 
54 See Reuter, supra note 5, at 95-98, on the political background ofthe recognition ofFYROM by the EC 
member states. 
55 For the English text, see 4 EJIL 72 (1993). 56 Text in id. at 73. 
57 For an English translation of the Macedonian Constitution, including amendments, see 9 CoNSTITU-
TIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE W ORLD, Release 94-6 (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1994). 
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the name "Macedonia" cannot therefore imply any territorial claim against an-
other State; and 
... that the Republic of Macedonia has given a formal undertaking in accordance 
with international law to refrain, both in general and pursuant to Article 49 of its 
Constitution in particular, from any hostile propaganda against any other State.58 
Despite this positive opinion, the EC member states did not recognize the Slavo-Mace-
donian republic, because of the Greek concerns about its name. 59 Instead, the European 
Council stated at the Lisbon summit meeting in June 1992 that the Community would 
recognize the state only under a name not containing the word ''Macedonia.' '60 On 
April 8, 1993, the EC member states approved the admission of FYROM to the United 
Nations. Again, this decision was taken unanimously by all EC members, including 
Greece. Most of the EC member states consider their vote in the UN General Assembly 
for FYRÖM's UN membership as conclusive international recognition of the republic 
under the name FYROM. 
To sum up the decisive elements of the politics concerning Slavo-Macedonia's name 
and borders: as an EC member, Greece enacted the guidelines on recognition. The EC 
Arbitration Commission, endorsed by Greece, decided that use of the name "Macedo-
riia" alone does not constitute a threat to Greece's territorial integrity. Skopje enacted 
constitutional amendments to underscore its acceptance of the present borders. The 
other member states could reasonably conclude from these events that Greece has en-
dorsed the Community policy with respect to FYROM and will not insist on further 
modifications of the Yugoslav republic's name, especially since significant compromises 
have been reached. In this situation, Greece's attempt to justify unilateral economic 
sanctions on the basis of the issues of name and flag does appear as a misuse of the 
exceptional power under Article 224 of the EC Treaty. 
lt is worth reiterating that this legal argument against Greece is not based on any 
judicial decision overruling the state's evaluation of the political situation, but on the 
fact that the defendant has previously signaled to the other member states that it will 
accept the name FYROM and thereby raised legitimate expectations. 
If the parties do not reach a nonjudicial compromise and thereby render the pending 
case moot, the Court will face a difficult task. Because the notion of misuse is vague, the 
result will depend on the degree of.scrutiny the Court chooses to apply to Greece's 
action. As it is disputed how much political discretion Article 224 leaves to the acting 
member state, the Court, as a Community organ, will probably try to avoid a political 
evaluation of the Greek-Slavo-Macedonian conflict as much as possible. Resort to the 
concept of estoppel, as suggested here, would serve this aim. Seen from the general 
perspective of Community policy, however, reliance on the concept of estoppel might 
have a chilling effect on Community decision making: member states might hesitate to 
take positions for fear of being estopped later.61 If we nevertheless accept the idea of 
estoppel, it would lead here to the conclusion that the Commission's action can be con-
sidered justified without determining whether the Greek fears and concerns regarding 
FYROM are lacking in reason. Greece seems to be estopped from invoking national 
58 Opinion No. 6, 4 EJIL at 77, 31 ILM at 1507, 1511. 
59 Parliamentary resofotion ofDec. 10, 1992. See Reuter, supra note 5, at 96. 
60 See para. 17 of the order, not yet reported. 
61 In the context of Community sanctions, at least one incident of contradictory behavior of member states 
was tolerated. Italy, Ireland and Denmark did not support the prolongation of Community sanctions against 
Argentina during the Falkland/Malvinas conflict, although they had previously supported the Community 
sanctions against the Soviet Union. Opting out was thus not consistent with their former position and could 
hardly be justified in terms of Article 224. Still, the Commission did not sue any member state for breach of 
Community law. 
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interests because it has tolerated the EC policy with respect to FYROM, thus acknowl-
edging that FYROM's policy does not constitute a serious threat to its territorial integ-
rity. However, the case illustrates that seemingly irrational fears cannot easily be swept 
aside by economic rationality. Even within the European Community, the conflict be-
tween indispensable economic and political integration and cooperation, on the one 
hand, and growing nationalism, on the other hand, must be handled. The question 
remains whether a judicial procedure is the appropriate means to solve such a conflict. 
Still, when other mechanisms are exhausted and when legal arguments are available to 
maintain an attitude of judicial self-restraint, the Court seems to be an appropriate 
decision maker. 
ANNE PETERS* 
International claims-expropriation-standard of compensation-prompt, adequate and 
effective versus appropriate compensation 
SHAHIN SHANE EBRAHIMI v. GOVERNMENT OF THE lSLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN. A WD 
560-44/46/47-3. 
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, October 12, 1994. 
This case concerns the important issue of the standard of compensation in cases of 
expropriation of an investor' s property by a national government. This note discusses 
the Tribunal's opinion, authored by Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz and concurred in by 
Richard C. Allison, the U.S. member of the Tribunal, 1 and Judge Allison's separate 
opinion. 2 lt does not discuss the dissenting opinion of the Iranian member of the Tri-
bunal, J udge Mohsen Agahosseni, which was not issued until February 9, 1995, too late 
to be considered in this note. 
Claimants were former shareholders who sought recovery of damages for the expro-
priation of their interests in Gostaresh Maskan Company (the Company), an Iranian 
construction firm allegedly expropriated in 1979. Claimants asserted that, following 
the Islamic Revolution, the Government of Iran appointed its own directors to go.vern 
the Company, thereby depriving claimants of their ownership rights as shareholders. 
Claimants sought compensation for their shares in the Company, totaling 19 percent of 
the Company's outstanding stock, in the amount of approximately $20 million, to-
gether with interest from the date of expropriation, attorney's fees and costs. 
In 1989 the Tribunal issued an interlocutory decision on jurisdiction, holding that 
the dominant and effective nationality of each of the claimants during the relevant 
period was that of the United States. In March 1993, the Tribunal's expert presented 
his report on valuation. The final award and Judge Allison's separate opinion were 
issued on October 12, 1994. 
The Tribunal found that the Company was expropriated pursuant to the Law Con-
cerning the Appointment of Provisional Manager(s) to Supervise Productive, Indus-
trial, Commercial, Agricultural and Service Units in the Private and Public Sections 
(the Act), which was promulgated by the Islamic Revolutionary Council in 1979. The 
Att permitted the Government of Iran to appoint directors to manage private corpora-
tions if "the managers and/or owners ... deserted [the corporation], or stopped the 
work, or [ were] not accessible for any reason whatsoever and upon request of [ the] 
* Dr.jur., University ofFreiburg; Rechtsassessorin. 
1 AWD 560-44/46/47-3.(0ct. 12, 1994) (Chamber 3) [Final Award]. 
2 AWD 560-44/46/47-3, Separate Opinion ofRichard C. Allison (Oct. 12, 1994) [Allison Opinion]. 
